Speaker
Description
In this paper I propose to argue the following: 1. In the history of philosophy there are several landmarks relevant to the approach and understanding of mental illness. In particular, philosophical orientations dealing with the meaning and role of human consciousness are important in this respect. I have in mind both the specific approaches of phenomenology and philosophy of mind, both of which provide significant analyses of phenomena specific to psychiatry. 2. At the intersection of philosophy and psychopathology, already explored with Jaspers, but having undergone an impressive development in recent decades, mental illnesses are described as disorders of consciousness, of the self, of language or as alterations occurring at the level of intersubjectivity.
Of these, I will consider alterations of consciousness and self. Becoming aware of oneself represents a leap for the self, which is characterised by the fact that it begins to distinguish itself from other people and the world, conceives of itself as autonomous, a leap that is closely linked to the development of a type of logical, clear, stringent, universally valid thinking, capable of discovering determined, enduring, recognisable objects in the world, revealing uniformities. Alterations in the experience of the self are part of the psychiatric sphere. Schizophrenia is considered a disease of consciousness, which interferes with and interrupts the human being's search for the meaning of life and the maintenance of emotional security. The illness manifests itself in the degradation of self-experience and loss of identity, which gradually becomes a pathological issue. The roots of psychiatry are to be found in classical philosophical writings, with Plato equating virtue with mental health.
